The Latest Dereliction of Duty: TV News Military Analysts and the Military Industrial Complex that Feeds Them

I'm glad to see that the media has finally done its job and uncovered the completely unsurprising links between the retired generals who serve as supposedly-independent Military Analysts on TV news and the Pentagon and Military Contractors whose talking points they invariably echo. It's one thing to know that there's no way these guys were picked because of their complete independence from the Pentagon and its big business contractors. It's another to have evidence that it goes so much further than that. It's a must-read. See Gadfly's post below for a good general overview.

A minor point I think deserves to be rebutted is this one from Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman:

It was, Mr. Whitman added, "a bit incredible" to think retired military officers could be "wound up" and turned into "puppets of the Defense Department."

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If you believe this, you don't know the military very well. These guys all retired at the rank of Colonel or higher, and if there's anything a soldier could tell you about the guys at the top of the pyramid, it's that they seem to have no idea what goes on at the bottom of it. The Colonels and Generals I've seen in Iraq rarely leave their offices, except to take other Generals and Colonels on tours in their helicopters. They are briefed more than once a day on operations, but those briefings are often a bit... sanitized to protect their subordinates. They simply don't have the feel that the guys outside the wire have for what's going on. Given the lack of recently retired Buck Sergeant hired to be a Military Analyst on MSNBC, this makes for a somewhat skewed view of the battlefield.

But more tragically, there's a system in place that almost ensures that by the time you reach the rank of General, you've spent so much time with your nose up the ass of the people who made it before you that it's the only way you know how to operate. You see, there aren't all that many openings for Generals in the military, so they can be choosy in who they pick to wear those stars. One of the main criteria for making it that far is having a spotless or near-spotless OER (Officer's Evaluation Report). To get a good OER, you basically have to be competent in your position and not piss off your commander.

And what might piss off a commander? Well, considering that he's got an OER of his own to look after, anything that might wreck his next promotion is pretty high on that list. All this basically means that the last thing you want to do as a junior officer looking up at the stars is think outside the box, take risks, put yourself on the line, or any of those other things that businesses were hiring consultants to tell them to do 10 years ago. The people who make General tend to be above average in intelligence, but risk-averse, thanks to a system that encourages lockstep thinking and looks askance at anything that bucks tradition.

So no, Mr. Whitman, it's not "a bit incredible" that retired Generals are puppets of the system. That's how they got there in the first place. And thanks to the extremely lucrative after-market in the defense contracting and lobbying business, these retired Generals know they've got to dance with the one that brung 'em. The quote from retired Colonel John C. Garrett in an email to the Pentagon shows just how closely tied these guys are to the system that created them. Preparing to go on FOX News to talk about the (then-upcoming) surge, he stated:

"Please let me know if you have any specific points you want covered or that you would prefer to downplay."

Almost as painful as the system that reduces America's military leaders into glad-handing yes-men is the pathetic cravenness of a figure such as Garrett, whose pitiful servility to the Administration and the Pentagon is so clearly expressed in this quote. He's not a man, he's a robot, sent out to do the bidding of his masters. Instead of leading, he's following, like a Private in Basic Training. Instead of getting the opinion of a Pattonesque leader, a man of action, a thick-skinned, no-nonsense man's man that the viewers imagine they'll get when the magic words "Retired General" flash across the screen, they get this mincing courtier saying nothing that we hadn't already heard from Ari Fleischer or Sean Hannity. We want Chesty Puller, but we get Willy Loman.

Cross-posted at Decline and Fall.

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The military-industrial complex is alive and kicking, lying for Iraq dollars

All those retired general talking heads on network and cable news programs? Most of them have big-time connections with defense weapons makers, otherwise politely called “military contractors.”

Those business relationships are hardly ever disclosed to the viewers, and sometimes not even to the networks themselves. But collectively, the … several dozen military analysts represent more than 150 military contractors either as lobbyists, senior executives, board members or consultants. The companies include defense heavyweights, but also scores of smaller companies, all part of a vast assemblage of contractors scrambling for hundreds of billions in military business generated by the administration’s war on terror. It is a furious competition, one in which inside information and easy access to senior officials are highly prized.

That’s why President Bush has had no problem in the past flying some of them on Air Force 2.

In turn, members of this group have echoed administration talking points, sometimes even when they suspected the information was false or inflated. Some analysts acknowledge they suppressed doubts because they feared jeopardizing their access.

A few expressed regret for participating in what they regarded as an effort to dupe the American public with propaganda dressed as independent military analysis.

“It was them saying, ‘We need to stick our hands up your back and move your mouth for you,’ ” Robert S. Bevelacqua, a retired Green Beret and former Fox News analyst, said.

Kenneth Allard, a former NBC military analyst who has taught information warfare at the National Defense University, said the campaign amounted to a sophisticated information operation. “This was a coherent, active policy,” he said.

As conditions in Iraq deteriorated, Mr. Allard recalled, he saw a yawning gap between what analysts were told in private briefings and what subsequent inquiries and books later revealed.

“Night and day,” Mr. Allard said, “I felt we’d been hosed.”

This is a long, 11-page exposé in the New York Times and well worth a read. More details on the jump.


Some of the 75 or so brass hat talking heads are also lobbyists, for example. The whole affair was launched in large part by former Defense Department assistant secretary for PR Torie Clarke. But, the military talkers were given their own, independently-officed handlers.

Others were in charge of contract negotiation or procurement at their firms, a very direct conflict of interest in going on TV and promoting the war.

Some of them had huge anti-media axes to grind going back to Vietnam:

This was a major theme, for example, with Paul E. Vallely, a Fox News analyst from 2001 to 2007. A retired Army general who had specialized in psychological warfare, Mr. Vallely co-authored a paper in 1980 that accused American news organizations of failing to defend the nation from “enemy” propaganda during Vietnam.

“We lost the war — not because we were outfought, but because we were out Psyoped,” he wrote. He urged a radically new approach to psychological operations in future wars — taking aim at not just foreign adversaries but domestic audiences, too. He called his approach “MindWar” — using network TV and radio to “strengthen our national will to victory.”

In a word, bullshit. Former DoD schmoozer and Donald Rumsfeld flunky Larry Di Rita confirms this was the attitude the Whatagon had. Other analysts, anonymously, also explicitly called this “psyops.”

Meanwhile, these talking heads coneheads were perfectly content to be led around by the nose by Paul Bremer et al on the occasions they actually did visit Iraq.

How can you be an “analyst” when you’re not actually out in the field analyzing anything?

But, most of the tin stars didn’t care. It was a way to meet U.S. mercenary companies like KBR, or Iraqi decision-makers, and try to drum up more business.

Showing their importance, one of the first things Gen. David Petraeus did after being named commander in Iraq was to meet with the group of analysts. I assume he does the same as part of his preparation for each round of Congressional testimony, so the talking heads are ready and armed.

And, for all of this bullshitting, most the analysts were being paid, in essence, on commission, by how many times they talked on TV.

And, while some of them admit soon being disillusioned about what lies BushCo was spinning, none of them saw fit to stop talking on TV. Those who were wary said “military loyalty” kept them from speaking out.

More bullshit. Fear of scorn from fellow colonels or generals is what it was, along with fear of losing contracts or lobbying access. As for loyalty to privates and noncoms, the actual military? Hah.

The few who did speak out? Well, this happened:

On Aug. 3, 2005, 14 marines died in Iraq. That day, William V. Cowan, who said he had grown increasingly uncomfortable with the “twisted version of reality” being pushed on analysts in briefings, called the Pentagon to give “a heads-up” that some of his comments on Fox “may not all be friendly,” Pentagon records show. Mr. Rumsfeld’s senior aides quickly arranged a private briefing for him, yet when he told Bill O’Reilly that the United States was “not on a good glide path right now” in Iraq, the repercussions were swift.

Cowan said he was “precipitously fired from the analysts group” for this appearance. The Pentagon, he wrote in an e-mail message, “simply didn’t like the fact that I wasn’t carrying their water.” The next day James T. Conway, then director of operations for the Joint Chiefs, presided over another conference call with analysts. He urged them, a transcript shows, not to let the marines’ deaths further erode support for the war.

As for the cable and network news companies? None of them asked questions about outside business dealings.

Today, of course, most these folks are ghettoized to Fox, but not all of them, and it certainly wasn’t that way in the run-up to the war and the first year afterward.

Of course, there are a few things you won’t find in the story.

One is the number of weapons contractors who give plenty of money to Democrats as well as Republicans. Indeed, one of the retired shills, Gen. John Ralston, eventually went to work for William Cohen’s lobbying group. True, Cohen was a Republican senator, but he became defense secretary in a Democratic administration.

The other is how much money some of these war merchants, war-merchant lobbyists and such, spend on advertising, both with the TV networks and in places like the NYT.

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GAO Blasts Department of Defense on Iraqi Police

[This post originally appeared on my blog, Blue Girl, Red State and was written by my friend and co-blogger Pale Rider - one of the sharpest minds blogging today.]

--By Pale Rider

They put out the NIE on Iran today in order to keep people from paying attention to what came out on Friday--the GAO Report on the Iraqi police forces.

The report, filed under the subject heading Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed, highlights a critical fact of what is going on in Iraq. The Iraqi police can't do anything independently, but the Bush Administration by way of the Department of Defense is doing everything it can to keep you from figuring that out. And it sent General Petraeus to testify before Congress about some things that weren't, ahem, not quite true. Oh my goodness, has St. David of the General Rank of Petraeus been caught lying to Congress? Perish the thought. And by the way, that was him walking on water a little while ago.

[Keep reading...]

The GAO goes on at length in their report, and I can't do it justice. I can't adequately parse all the polite doublespeak in a way that adequately expresses how outraged we should all be.

A few things stand out. The GAO says:

...the Administration’s September 14, 2007, Benchmark Assessment Report stated that although some Iraqi Army and police forces were operating independently, it also stated that the greatest constraints on independent operations were a shortage of trained leaders and an immature logistics capability, and that for the present time Coalition partnership and support remained necessary for most ISF operations.

"Independently." Remember when this was an issue? Let's get in the way-way back machine and travel all the way back to 2005:

Sep 29, 2005 - from USA Today:

WASHINGTON — The Iraqi military has only one battalion — about 500-600 soldiers — capable of fighting on its own, U.S. commanders told lawmakers Thursday.
Many Iraqi police are not being paid, and insurgents are infiltrating Iraqi police and military forces, the commanders acknowledged. Even so, Gen. George Casey, the top U.S. general in Iraq, said U.S. troops could start leaving next year if Iraqi voters back a proposed constitution and form a government.
"I do believe that the possibility for condition-based reductions of coalition forces still exists in 2006," Casey told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

[snip]

In his final appearance as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retiring Gen. Richard Myers told McCain that he never said "things are going very well in Iraq" and that the United States is not developing a "cut-and-run strategy."
"This is a win strategy," Myers said, adding that Iraqis were making progress toward forming a government. "In a sense, things are going well."
The commanders didn't say how many qualified Iraqi troops would be necessary to allow U.S. withdrawals.
In June, the Pentagon said three of 100 Iraqi battalions were capable of acting on their own, Casey acknowledged. Thursday morning, that estimate changed to one.
After a recess, Casey said the new assessment of Iraqi readiness stemmed from a new, more demanding standard U.S. commanders use to judge Iraqi forces.

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So, in just over two years, the Iraqi police are in the same shape today that they were then. In other words, they've made no progress whatsoever in any of the important areas they needed to improve. In 2005, we were told that they have tens of thousands that don't show up, that the insurgents have infiltrated the forces, that there is inadequate training and the units can't fight independently.

According to the GAO, not a damned thing has changed. I guess Generals Petraeus and Hunzeker--two individuals, who you'll recall, once were given responsibility for training the Iraqi police forces--did a bang-up job training the Iraqi police--so much so that they got promoted and were given great new jobs. If there was any accountability whatsoever in the United States Army, the only assignment these two generals would have right now is a temporary billet at Fort Living Room with a future engagement planned at Camp Golf Course.

Just a few highlights--and the intrepid Blue Girl will tell us more when time permits--

...As of July 2007, the Iraqi Army was short 18,000 corporals, 14,500 sergeants, and 7,500 sergeants first class. With MNSTC-I advice and assistance, the Iraqis are working a number of initiatives to address this leadership shortage.

...the MOI is facing the fundamental challenge of not being able to accurately account for its personnel. According to DOD’s June and September 2007 reports to Congress, there is currently no reliable data on how many Coalition-trained personnel are still serving in the MOI’s forces. Moreover, DOD has also reported that the MOI has hired a significant number of police beyond those trained by the Coalition. According to testimony by the former MNSTC-I commander, the MOI’s payroll accounts for about 60,000 to 74,000 more personnel than the number trained and equipped by the Coalition. However, he also stated that about 20 percent of this overage are “ghosts,” meaning personnel whose names appear on the MOI’s payroll but who are not actually serving.

...According to both the former and current MNSTC-I commanders, the National Police are also beset with widespread sectarianism. In June 2007, the former MNSTC-I commander testified that the Iraqi National Police was the “single most sectarian organization in Iraq.” Two months later, the current MNSTC-I commander echoed his predecessor’s assessment, stating that the National Police were “overly infiltrated with militia elements” and that “there’s no doubt that in the National Police the sectarian influence remains and will be hard to eradicate.” Finally, evidence indicates that the Iraqi Police Service is also heavily infiltrated with sectarian elements. The former commander of the Iraq Assistance Group13 characterized the Iraqi Police Service as the ISF element most vulnerable to sectarianism, despite the MOI’s removal of over 3,000 members considered to have a sectarian bias in January 2007.

...Since January 2007, the Iraqi government has replaced 70 percent of senior commanders in the National Police due to their sectarianism, a list that includes 2 division, 7 brigade, and 17 battalion commanders. These high level command changes are especially significant given that the National Police are facing a critical officer shortage; by the summer of 2007 they had filled fewer than half of their officer positions. Despite these officer changes, however, according to a July 2007 DOD report, there continues to be a sectarian bias in the appointment of senior Iraqi police commanders.

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What did General Petraeus tell Congress? Well, the GAO weighs in on that, too:

For example, in its most recent report to Congress, issued in September 2007, DOD stated that 95 Army, Special Operations Combat Forces, and Iraqi Army Infrastructure units; an indeterminate number of MOD logistics enablers; 7 National Police Combat Battalions; and 3 National Police Brigade Headquarters were all “capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations independently or with Iraqi or Coalition forces.” Although in none of these reports does DOD distinguish between those forces that are capable of operating independently and those that require Coalition or Iraqi assistance, the tables in which DOD’s data are presented lead one to believe that at least one if not more than one of the units was rated as independent. This was underscored during the MNF-I commander’s September 10 and 11, 2007 testimony, during which he briefed the Congress that in every month since November 2005, with only one exception (February 2006) the Coalition has assessed at least one ISF unit as “fully independent.”

The GAO has a disturbing finding on this--

However, despite DOD’s reports and the MNF-I commander’s recent testimony that a certain number of ISF have been assessed as “fully independent,” after March 2006 it was no longer possible for a Coalition transition team member to rate the readiness of an ISF unit using these terms. Previously, in guidance provided to Coalition transition teams for use in evaluating Iraqi Security Forces, a level 1 unit was said to be “fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations.” However, in the spring of 2006, MNC-I removed the words “fully” and “independent” from the definition. When we asked DOD officials for the reason for this change they were not able to provide us with an explanation. Therefore, according to the current guidance, a level 1 unit is one that is “capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.” It is important to note that, according to the guidance, a Coalition transition team cannot judge an ISF unit as “independent.” However, in its most recent report to Congress, DOD asserted that an “independent unit is one that is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.” Thus, DOD’s continued reporting that some ISF units are “independent” or “fully independent” is not congruent with MNC-I’s instructions for filling out the Operational Readiness Assessments on which DOD’s assertions and reports seem to be based. If independence is still a relevant descriptor of ISF unit capabilities, then why was the term removed from the definition of a level 1 unit in 2006?
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So did General Petraeus lie to Congress? Did he commit perjury?

My reaction to all of this is...[sigh].

Another day, another outrage. And we don't have a working press to tell all of this to the American people.

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